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This paper analyses the performance consequences of board 
structure changes in Ghana for the study period 2000 to 2009. In 
2003, the Ghanaian listed firms adopted the Ghanaian Corporate 
Governance Code on comply or explain basis but no study to date 
has analysed the pre-2003 and post-2003 board structure changes 
impact on firm performance in the Ghanaian environment. We 
predict that board structure changes prompted by the introduction 
of the Ghanaian Code in 2003 should lead to better firm 
performance. Using a panel regression model, our results show that 
duality decreases firm performance pre-2003, but those firms that 
separate the two posts in line with the recommendations of the 
Ghanaian Code did not perform better than those that combined the 
two post-2003. While we find no relationship between board 
committees and firm performance pre-2003, the relationship 
switched to positive and statistically significant post-2003. The 
most consistent result we find concerns board size. However, the 
non-executive director representation on the board appears to have 
no impact on firm performance. These results show that not all 
board structure recommendations introduced by the Ghanaian Code 
are effective in achieving superior performance in Ghana. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Structure, Firm 
Performance, Ghana 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, we analyse the impact of board 
structure changes on the performance of the 
Ghanaian listed firms. The Ghanaian listed firms 
have recently adopted corporate governance 
guidelines on best practices (hereafter the Ghanaian 
Code) and are expected to comply or provide an 
explanation for non-compliance with the code 
provisions. Although compliance is not backed by 
the force of law as in the case of the UK and South 
African codes, it has provided a number of 
recommendations on governance best practices, 
including role separation between the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the 
board of directors, board size ranging from eight to 
sixteen members, a balance of executive and non-
executive directors with at least one-third of 
independent directors on the board and the 
establishment of board committees (both audit and 
remuneration).  
Despite the objective of these codes being 
underpinned by agency theory aligning the 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests, prior studies 
on the relationship between board structure 
governance mechanisms and firm performance is 
inconclusive. One stream of empirical papers has 
indicated that corporate governance is positively 
associated with firm performance whereas others 
have found a negative or no relationship between 
the two. The empirical papers that reported a 
positive relationship are based on the aspect of 
agency theory that implies efficient board structures 
can significantly minimise agency costs with the 
consequential effect on firm performance. First, 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) showed that firms with 
separate board chairpersons consistently 
outperformed those with the combined role or CEO 
duality for large US corporations. Similarly, Adams 
and Mehran (2012), as well as Meyer and Wet (2013), 
observed a statistically significant and positive 
association between board size and firm 
performance. Cho and Kim (2007) reported that the 
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rate of outside directors’ participation is significant 
and positively related to firm performance. Laing 
and Weir (1999) found that the presence of audit 
and remuneration committees do have a positive 
impact on firm performance. Recently, Soliman et al 
(2014) found a positive association between role 
separation, board size, board independence, audit 
committee and firm performance.  
In contrast, other studies have found a negative 
relationship between these board structure 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. In 
particular, Donaldson and Davis (1991) observed 
that firms with the combined roles of the CEO and 
the Chairman or CEO duality perform better than 
those that separate the two roles. Similarly, Dey et al 
(2011) discovered that firms that split the CEO and 
Chairman roles due to investors’ pressure have 
significantly lower announcement returns and 
subsequent performance, and lower contribution to 
shareholder wealth. Yarmack (1996) reported that 
board size is negatively related to firm performance, 
evidence supported by Eisenberg et al (1998) and 
Guest (2009). Bozec (2005) found that the 
proportion of outside representation on the board 
and the presence of audit committees are negatively 
related to firm performance. 
The third stream of researchers found no 
relationship between these board structure 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
Chen et al (2008), for example, documented an 
increased number of firms changing from dual to 
non-dual but their findings do not show any 
significant relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance nor improvement in firm 
performance after a change of leadership structure. 
Wintoki et al (2012) found no causal relationship 
between board size and firm performance after re-
examining a larger sample of US firms. Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) observed that the representation of 
outsider directors has no impact on firm 
performance. Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) found no 
statistically significant differences in firm 
performance between boards with audit and 
remuneration committees and those that do not 
have such committees. 
Although the relationship between board 
structure governance mechanisms and firm 
performance are still not conclusive, evidence on the 
pre and post-adoption of a particular code impact 
on firm performance is still limited. In the UK, Weir 
and Laing (2000) analysed the relationship between 
board structure governance mechanisms and firm 
performance for two years, 1992 (pre-1992 Cadbury 
report) and 1995 (post-1992 Cadbury report) but 
documented mixed evidence. They found a 
significant and consistent negative relationship 
between outside directors and firm performance 
during both sub-periods. However, they found the 
presence of a remuneration committee to have no 
impact on firm performance during the pre-1992 
Cadbury Report, but a positive and significant 
impact on firm performance during the post-1992 
Cadbury Report. On the other hand, Bhagat and 
Bolton (2009), using US firm data, separated their 
sample into pre and post  2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(S-Ox) to investigate how governance-performance 
relationship might have been impacted by the Act. 
They reported a negative and significant relationship 
between board independence and operating 
performance during the pre-2002 period, but a 
positive and significant relationship during the post-
2002 period. 
Ghana, a developing country was selected 
because, from an institutional perspective, it differs 
significantly from the two developed countries (UK 
and US) noted above. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no study in any developing countries that 
has examined board structure changes impact on 
firm performance before and after the introduction 
of a code of corporate governance. We, therefore, 
add to the literature by investigating the extent to 
which board structure recommendations made by 
the Ghanaian Code have affected firm performance. 
In this respect, we assess the relationship between 
board structure governance mechanisms and firm 
performance for two sub-periods across Ghanaian 
listed firms, one for pre-2003 (2000-2002) and the 
other for post-2003 (2004-2009). The Ghanaian Code 
which was published in 2003 by the Security and 
Exchange Commission Ghana (SECG) will be the 
basis for the analyses of the impact of board 
structure changes on firm performance. The pre-
2003 represents the period prior to the publication 
of the code and therefore board structure 
governance mechanisms-performance relationship 
pre-Ghanaian Code. The post-2003 findings will 
show the extent to which the recommended board 
structure changes have been implemented and their 
subsequent impact on firm performance post-
Ghanaian Code. 
Unlike Weir and Laing (2000), we use panel data 
drawn from annual reports published by the Ghana 
Stock Exchange (GSE) listed firms over a ten-year 
period from 2000 to 2009. We explicitly separate the 
data into two distinct periods: pre-2003 and post-
2003, thus to enable us to capture the changing 
corporate governance landscape. Given the panel 
nature of our data, we use a panel regression model 
to find whether firm performance might have been 
impacted by the board structure changes. We find 
evidence to suggest that duality is statistically 
significant and negatively related to firm 
performance pre-2003, but those firms that separate 
the two posts in line with the recommendations of 
the Ghanaian Code did not perform better than 
those that combined the two post-2003. While we 
find no relationship between board committees and 
firm performance pre-2003, the relationship 
switched to statistically significant post-2003. The 
most consistent result we find concerns board size. 
However, the non-executive director representation 
on the board appears to have no impact on firm 
performance. Our results over the whole period, 
2000-2009 show that duality, board size and board 
committees explain some of the changes in firm 
performance. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
discusses the recent corporate governance reforms 
in Ghana, reviews the relevant studies and develops 
a series of hypotheses for testing. Section 3 
describes the sample, variables and the model used 
in our empirical analysis reported in section 4. 
Finally, we provide concluding remarks and some 
suggestion for future research in section 5. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Agency theory 
 
This paper’s theoretical basis is founded on agency 
theory and in this context we clarify the 
development of the rationale for an application in 
the corporate governance landscape. Although not 
naming the problem, Berle and Means (1932), can be 
identified as a logical starting point; they elaborated 
on the structure of the modern corporation whilst 
identifying the paradox of the shareholders as 
‘masters’, yet ceding control and oversight to 
management. Essentially, dispersed ownership as it 
was in the US context meant that shareholders 
owning a portfolio of shares were unlikely to be 
concerned with the day to day operations of the 
corporation. Therefore it provides management with 
a possible incentive, and most definite opportunity, 
to serve their best interest instead of the 
shareholders.  
The conflict of interests between the 
shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) emanated from the separation of ownership 
and control (Berle and Means, 1932) has led to the 
notorious agency problem. Fundamental to the 
agency problem is lack of monitoring and 
accountability, something which agency theory tries 
to address through board structure governance 
mechanisms such as the leadership role separation, 
optimum board size, non-executive directors 
representation, audit, and remuneration committees 
to realign the interests of shareholders and 
managers. The theory has impacted on the 
development of corporate governance codes around 
the world, and in 2003, the SECG published the 
Ghanaian version and encouraged firms to comply 
with its recommendations or provide an explanation 
for non-compliance. We argue that the introduction 
of the Ghanaian Code should lead to board structure 
changes, hence effective monitoring and 
accountability with a consequential effect on 
superior firm performance.  
 
2.2. Board leadership structure (CEO duality) 
 
The agency theory position is that CEO duality is bad 
because having the CEO as the Chairman of the 
board to evaluate his/her own work defeats the 
objective of having the board to monitor 
management leading to accountability failure. This is 
because the CEO may use his/her power as a board 
Chairman to select directors who are not expected to 
challenge his/her actions (Westphal and Zajac, 
1995). In this respect, the board will be incapable of 
effectively monitoring and evaluating the CEO’s 
actions because the CEO duality ‘signals the absence 
of separation of decision management and decision 
control’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.314). This 
suggests that a board controlled by the CEO is 
expected to lack independence which may lead to 
more agency problems, and eventually, poor firm 
performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and 
Timme, 1993). This problem is addressed by the UK 
and the South African codes which recommend that 
the roles of the CEO and the Chairman should be 
separated. The Ghanaian Code also recommends a 
similar leadership structure. In fact, there is likely to 
be lack of independence between the board and 
management if one person occupies the two roles.  
The empirical evidence of whether CEO duality 
is better than separating the two roles in enhancing 
firm performance is mixed. First, and as in line with 
the agency theory, many prior studies have found a 
negative impact of CEO duality on firm performance 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and Timme, 1993; 
Dahya et al, 1996; Worrell et al, 1997; Faccio and 
Lasfer, 1999; Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; Bozec, 2005; 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Ujunwa; 2012; Soliman et al, 2014). 
These researchers argued that a combined 
leadership structure may lead to the implementation 
of the decisions that favours the CEO’s personal 
objectives at the expense of the shareholders and 
therefore poor performance. In contrast, other 
studies have found a positive association between 
CEO duality and firm performance (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Brickley et al, 1997; Boyd et al, 1997; 
O’Sullivan and Wong, 1999; Coles et al, 2001; 
Buckland, 2001; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Peng et al, 
2007; Dey et al, 2011; Guillet et al, 2013; Yang and 
Zhao, 2014). A third group of studies have found no 
significant association between CEO duality and firm 
performance (Daily and Dalton, 1993; Baliga et al, 
1996; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Dalton et al, 
1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir et al, 2002; 
Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Elsayed, 2007; Chen et 
al, 2008; Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008).  
However, and consistent with the agency 
theory, the Ghanaian Code does recommend the 
separation of the two roles as best practice. This 
may be seen to be more effective in terms of 
enhancing firm performance and also to limit the 
power of the CEO of monitoring the monitors. 
Arguably, prior CEO duality-performance 
relationship evidence among listed firms in Ghana is 
limited to governance data from a questionnaire 
survey (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006) which 
might not reflect the actual governance practices by 
the Ghanaian firms over a longer period. Given that 
no research to date has examined the impact of the 
Ghanaian Code recommendation of the changes in 
role separation on firm performance, the first 
relevant hypothesis is operationalised in the 
following form: 
H1: There is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between a combined leadership structure 
and firm performance. 
 
2.3. Board size 
 
Lipton and Lorch (1992) and Jensen (1993) are of the 
view that although larger board size initially assists 
keyboard functions, it comes to a point when larger 
boards suffer from coordination and communication 
problems and therefore board effectiveness 
deteriorates. Prior studies have found some mixed 
results on the relationship between board size and 
firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Faccio and Lasfer, 
1999; Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; Guest, 2009; Adams 
and Mehran, 2012; Wintoki et al, 2012). Yermack 
(1996) was one of the first researchers to investigate 
board size-performance relationship. Using a sample 
of 452 large US firms between 1984 and 1991, he 
found an inverse relationship between board size 
and firm performance. Recent studies (Eisenberg et 
al, 1998; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Vefeas, 1999; 
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Dahya et al, 2002; Lasfer, 2004; Bozec, 2005; Mak 
and Kusnadi, 2005; Cheng, 2008; Cheng et al, 2008; 
Bennedsen et al, 2008; Guest, 2009; O’Connell and 
Cramer, 2010; Guo and Kga, 2012; Ujunwa, 2012) 
have mostly found consistent results with those of 
Yermack (1996) that board size is negatively related 
to firm performance. In particular, Eisenberg et al 
(1998) criticised Yermack (1996) for mainly focusing 
on large firms, and for that matter, his findings 
cannot be extended to smaller firms, as well as those 
firms operating in different legal and cultural 
environments. In this respect, Eisenberg et al (1998) 
investigated the relationship between board size and 
firm performance across 879 small and medium size 
firms in Finland from 1992 to 1994. In line with 
Yermack (1996), they reported a statistically 
significant and negative relationship between board 
size and firm performance. 
In contrast, other studies (Faccio and Lasfer, 
1999; Kiel and Nicolson, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman 
and Biekpe, 2006; El Mehdi, 2007; Kajola, 2008; 
Coles et al, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Sanda et 
al, 2010; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Meyer and Wet, 
2013; Soliman et al, 2014) have found a positive 
relationship between board size and firm 
performance. These findings support the view that 
larger boards offer greater exposure to the external 
environment than smaller boards which improve 
access to various resources and therefore positively 
impacts on performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
Goodstein et al, 2006). The third group of studies 
has found no significant relationship between board 
size and firm performance (Dulewicz and Herbert, 
2004; Bennett and Robson, 2004; Wintoki et al, 
2012). In particular, Wintoki et al (2012) re-examined 
the relationship between board size and firm 
performance across 6,000 US-listed firms from 1991 
to 2003 but found no relationship between the two. 
Arguably, Coles et al (2008) in their study 
grouped 8165 firm-year observation from 1992 to 
2001 into complex and simple firms in the US and 
reported that larger board size is positively 
associated with complex firms but this is opposite in 
simple firms where smaller board size is positively 
associated with firm performance. Their evidence 
suggests that very small or very large board size is 
optimal given the nature of a particular firm. 
Although the board size-firm performance 
relationship is inconclusive, the Ghanaian Code 
recommends a minimum board size of 8 and a 
maximum of 16, hence, the second relevant 
hypothesis is operationalised in the following form: 
H2: There is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between board size and firm 
performance.  
 
2.4. Board independence 
 
Given the agency theory proposition that boards 
dominated by executive directors (insiders) are not 
accountable to shareholders (Fama, 1980; 
Sonnenfeld; 2002), the presence of non-executive 
directors on the board with their different expertise 
enhances board decision making process through 
their independent mind and judgment (Cadbury, 
1992). Notwithstanding the important role that the 
presence of non-executive directors plays in 
reducing the agency problems, evidence on the 
relationship between board independence and firm 
performance is mixed (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Daily 
and Dalton, 1993; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Klein, 
1998; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al, 2002; 
Bozec, 2005; El Mehdi, 2007; Coles et al, 2008; 
Kajola, 2008; Guest, 2009; Sanda et al, 2010, Adams 
and Mehran, 2012; Wintoki et al, 2012). Using a 
sample of 119 US Fortune 500 industrial firms from 
1983 to 1989, Pearce and Zahra (1992) found the 
proportion of outside directors to have statistically 
significant and positive impact on firm performance. 
Similarly, recent studies have also reported a 
positive relationship between the presence of non-
executive directors and firm performance (Faccio 
and Lasfer, 1999; Weir et al, 2002; Abor and Biekpe, 
2007; El Mehdi, 2007; Cho and Kim, 2007; Coles et 
al, 2008; Gupta and Fields, 2009; Jackling and Johl, 
2009; Soliman et al, 2014).  
In contrast, other studies (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Kiel and Nicolson, 
2003; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Bozec, 2005; 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006; Guest, 2009, 
Mangena et al, 2012) have reported that the presence 
of non-executive directors’ representation on the 
board is negatively related to firm performance. This 
indicates that the benefit of board independence; 
objectivity and experience expected from the 
representation of outside directors to influence 
board decisions appears to hold back managerial 
initiative through too much monitoring. 
Interestingly, a third group of studies (Daily and 
Dalton, 1992; Klein, 1998; Vafeas and Theodorou, 
1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing; 2000; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ghosh, 2006; Kajola, 
2008; Sanda et al, 2010; Adams and Mehran; 2012; 
Wintoki et al, 2012) also suggest that the presence of 
outside directors on the board has no effect on firm 
performance.  
Despite the inconclusive evidence, the 
Ghanaian Code recommends a balance of executive 
and non-executive directors on the board to monitor 
the activities of management. This means that the 
inclusion of non-executive directors on the board 
should, therefore, ensure effective monitoring of the 
executive directors whose interests are not aligned 
with shareholders value maximisation. Conyon and 
Peck (1998) argued that if outside directors either 
hold no shares or hold an insignificant number of 
shares, their motivation to monitor the executive 
directors, and therefore defend the shareholder 
interests may be immaterial. This is particularly 
important because the existence of the board as the 
most effective internal control mechanism for 
monitoring the executive directors’ behaviour (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) may not be achieved. Given that a 
high proportion of non-executive directors with little 
or no shareholdings suggest weak monitoring, the 
third relevant hypothesis is operationalised in the 
following form:  
H3: There is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and firm performance. 
 
2.5 . Board committees 
 
The impact of the presence of board committees on 
firm performance is still not clear as the research in 
this area is at its emergent stage (Dalton et al, 1998; 
Laing and Weir, 1999). However, and given the 
important functions of the board committees in an 
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attempt to help reduce the agency problems 
resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control (Berle and Means, 1932) provide an 
interesting area for further research. This is 
particularly important in a developing country 
context as it may help to provide further insights on 
the board committees-performance relationship. The 
empirical evidence on board committees-
performance relationship is mixed (Wild, 1994; 
Klein, 1998; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and 
Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005; Black and Kim, 2012). Using 
a sample of 260 US-listed firms from 1966 to 1980, 
Wild (1994) investigated the market reaction before 
and after the establishment of audit committees. He 
reported a statistically significant improvement in 
share returns following the establishment of audit 
committees, indicating that the presence of audit 
committees can improve managerial accountability 
to shareholders. Similarly, and using a sample of 
115 UK listed firms during 1992 and 1995, Laing 
and Weir (1999) observed that the presence of audit 
and remuneration committees do positively affect 
firm performance. Recently, Soliman et al (2014) 
reported a positive association between the presence 
of audit committee and firm performance across 
Egyptian listed firms. 
In contrast, and unlike Laing and Weir (1999) 
and Soliman et al (2014), prior studies have failed to 
find consistent evidence between board committees 
and firm performance (Bozec, 2005; Black and Kim, 
2012; Lam and Lee, 2012). Using a sample of 25 
Canadian firms from 1976 to 2000, Bozec (2005) 
found the presence of audit committees to have a 
negative impact on firm performance. However, he 
found the presence of nomination committees to 
have a positive impact on firm performance. Recent 
evidence by Black and Kim (2012) in Korea on 658 
large public firms and 611 smaller firms found 
nomination and audit committees to have a 
statistically significant and positive impact on large 
public firms’ performance but not smaller firms. 
They, however, observed that remuneration 
committees have no impact on both large and 
smaller firms’ performance. Consistent with Black 
and Kim (2012), Lam and Lee (2012) examined the 
relationship between board committees and firm 
performance in a sample of 346 Hong Kong public 
listed firms from 2001 to 2003 and found a 
statistically significant and positive relationship 
between the presence of nomination committees and 
firm performance. At the same time, however, they 
found a statistically significant and negative 
relationship between the presence of compensation 
committees and firm performance. 
The third group of studies (Klein, 1998; Vafeas 
and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al, 2002; Dulewicz and 
Herbert, 2004; Kajola, 2008) have indicated no 
empirical relationship between board committees 
and firm performance. In Ghana, Kyereboah-
Coleman and Amidu (2008) reported that the 
presence of audit committees is beneficial to the 
performance of SMEs. However, there is no available 
evidence regarding the impact of the establishment 
of board committees on Ghanaian listed firms’ 
performance. Given that the Ghanaian Code 
recommends the establishment of an audit 
committee and a remuneration committee in order 
to improve the effectiveness of the Ghanaian listed 
firms’ board operations, the fifth relevant 
hypothesis is operationalised in the following form:  
H4a: The presence of an audit committee should 
lead to better firm performance. 
H4b: The presence of a remuneration committee 
should lead to better firm performance. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Data and sample 
 
The data is drawn from annual reports published 
during 2000-2009 by firms listed on the GSE. We 
choose this period for two main reasons. First, the 
SECG introduced the Ghanaian Code in 2003 and 
required firms to comply or provide an explanation 
of non-compliance in their annual reports; hence, we 
can obtain the required data before and after the 
introduction of the code from the annual reports. 
Second, we are able to separate the sample period 
into pre-2003 (2000-2002) and post-2003 (2004-
2009) introduction of the Ghanaian Code, thus 
allowing us to capture the changing corporate 
governance landscape in Ghana and its effect on 
firm performance. As at 31 December 2009, 38 firms 
were listed on the GSE but 3 of them did not have 
their annual reports available and therefore 
excluded from the sample. The remaining 35 listed 
firms represent 92% of all listed firms traded on the 
GSE as at the period under consideration, bringing 
together 283 firm-year observations. Based on the 
Ghanaian Code provisions, the board structure 
variables include CEO duality (DUALITY), board size 
(BODSIZE), board independence (BODINDP), audit 
committee (AUCOM) and remuneration committee 
(RECOM) which are defined in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Measurement of the board structure 
variables 
 
Variable 
Name 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Operationalisation of the 
variable 
CEO Duality DUALITY 
A binary number of ‘1’ if the 
CEO also holds the position of 
chairman or ‘0’ if both 
positions are separated 
Board Size BODSIZE 
The total number of directors 
on the board of a firm at the 
end of each financial year 
Board 
Independence 
BODINDP 
The number of NEDs divided 
by the number of directors on 
the board of a firm at the end 
of each financial year 
Audit 
Committee 
AUCOM 
A binary number of ‘1’ if a 
firm has an audit committee 
in place at the end of each 
financial year or ‘0’ if 
otherwise  
Remuneration 
Committee 
RECOM 
A binary number of ‘1’ if a 
firm has a remuneration 
committee in place at the end 
of each financial year or ‘0’ if 
otherwise 
 
The firm performance measures we use are 
return on assets (ROA); defined as operating profit 
after tax divided by the book value of total assets, 
and return on equity (ROE) defined as operating 
profit after tax divided by the book value of equity. 
Consistent with Samia et al (2011) who argue that 
ROA and ROE are short-term performance measures, 
we also use Tobin’s Q (Q) defined as the market 
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value of total assets divided by the book value of 
total assets, where the market value of total assets is 
measured by the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity (Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Garay and Gonzalez, 2008) to take account of the 
long-term firm performance measure in our analysis. 
This is particularly important because of insiders 
(management) and outsiders (investors) value firm 
performance differently (Black et al, 2006), hence, 
the accounting-based (ROA and ROE) and market-
based (Q) performance measures for our empirical 
analysis. 
We also include several variables to control for 
other potential factors that may influence firm 
performance. In line with prior studies (Short and 
Keasey, 1999; Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Garay and 
Gonzalez, 2008; Bozec et al, 2010), we include 
gearing (GEAR) defined as the ratio of total debt to 
capital employed, where capital employed is the sum 
of total debt and equity; growth opportunities 
(GROWTH) defined as the percentage of the 
difference between the current year’s of sales and 
previous year’s of sales divided by the previous 
year’s of sales of each firm; firm size (SIZE) defined 
as the natural log of the book value of a firm’s total 
assets; institutional shareholdings (INSTHOLD) 
defined as the proportion of shares held by 
institutional shareholders in excess of 3% of total 
shareholding and managerial ownership (MGROWN) 
defined as the proportion of shares held by 
executive directors to the total shareholdings.  
Yu (2008) is of the view that firms that are not 
actively followed by analysts or brokers or not 
audited by one of the Big 4 auditors try to always 
artificially improve their performance by 
manipulating their accounting numbers and 
abnormal accruals, hence, we control for the 
accounting regime which is the adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (AIFRS) 
defined as a binary number 1 if the firm has adopted 
IFRS or 0 if otherwise, and earnings smoothing 
measures such as discretionary accruals (DAs) 
estimated using modified Jones Model (Dechow 
et al., 1995) - DAs
j,t 
= (TAC
j,t
/TA
j,t
)−NA and audit 
quality (AUDITOR) defined as a binary number of 1 
if the firm is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms 
or 0 if otherwise. We also include firm-specific 
dummy and year dummy variables. 
 
3.2. Method of estimation  
 
Most prior studies involving panel data in examining 
the association between board structure changes 
and firm performance turn to use ordinary least 
square (OLS) model or the alternative of the panel 
regression models (e.g. random effects or fixed 
effects) without testing to ensure consistent and 
efficient results. To achieve consistent and efficient 
results in this study, and unlike prior pre and post 
board structure-performance relationship studies 
(Weir and Laing, 2000; Bhagat and Bolton, 2009), we 
assess the suitability of the regression models 
before our empirical analysis. This makes our study 
different from prior pre and post studies in general 
and in particular the Ghanaian studies. We therefore 
employ Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange 
Multiplier test to enable us to differentiate between 
OLS and the options of random effects or fixed 
effects; and the Hausman (1978) specification test to 
distinguish between random effects and fixed 
effects regression models.  
The Hausman specification test allows us to 
determine which panel regression model is 
appropriate for our empirical analysis. The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there is no 
correlation between the unique errors and the 
explanatory variables used in the regression model, 
suggesting a test of strict exogeneity. The decision is 
as follows: if there is no correlation between the 
unique errors and the explanatory variables, random 
effects regression model is suitable. Otherwise, use 
the fixed effects model if there is a correlation 
between the unique errors and the explanatory 
variables. Using ROA, ROE and Q as the firm 
performance measures in equations 1, the Hausman 
test gave X2 of 27.32, 31.12 and 18.51 (p-value = 
0.000, 0.000 and 0.000), suggesting that the 
hypothesis of no correlation between the unique 
errors and the board structures as explanatory 
variables is rejected, hence, fixed effects regression 
is considered suitable for our method of estimation. 
The following fixed effects regression model is 
therefore specified: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡) + 
𝑛
𝑗=1
∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑛+𝑚
𝑘=𝑛+1
 (1) 
  
       
where, PERFORMANCE
it
 is the dependent variable, 
which is measured using ROA, ROE or Q; 𝛼 is the 
overall intercept; 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 is the board structure 
governance variables represented by the CEO duality 
(DUALITY), board size (BODSIZE), board 
independence (BODINDP), audit committee (AUCOM) 
and remuneration committee (RECOM), j, for firm i 
in year t;  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑡 is a set of firm specific control 
variables, k, for firm i in year t; where k = 1 to m; 𝜃𝑡 
is a vector of 9 dummy variables representing the 10 
sample years; 𝛿𝑖 is the firm specific fixed effects, 
consisting of a vector of 34 dummy variables to 
represent the 35 sample firms; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the 
unobserved error component. As previously 
operationalised, the hypotheses expectations in  
relation to board structure variables are summarised 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Predicted signs for the relationship between 
board structure and firm performance 
 
Board structure variables 
Firm performance measures 
ROA ROE Q-ratio 
CEO duality - - - 
Board size + + + 
Non-executive directors - - - 
Audit committee + + + 
Remuneration committee + + + 
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4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the board 
structure and firm performance variables for the 
whole period from 2000 to 2009. The average return 
on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s Q are 5.699, 
18.667 and 2.128 respectively. On average, 16% of 
the Ghanaian listed firms have the posts of CEO and 
chairman combined with the board size making up 
an average of 8.52. The average non-executive 
director representation on the board is 75.80%. Some 
70% of the Ghanaian firms have established audit 
committee but only 28% on average have a 
remuneration committee.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of board structure and 
firm performance variables 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA % 5.699 11.322 -29.737 70.669 
ROE % 18.667 39.769 -40.061 53.611 
Q 2.128 1.674 -2.59 15.121 
DUALITY % 16.00 2.200 0.000 1.00 
BODSIZE 8.52 2.154 4.000 18.000 
BODINDP % 75.80 13.096 22.222 90.909 
AUCOM 0.70 0.461 0.000 1.000 
RECOM 0.28 0.448 0.000 1.000 
GEAR % 26.95 26.089 0.00 70.326 
GROWTH 0.091 0.517 -0.999 3.303 
SIZE 6.498 1.325 3.886 9.284 
MGROWN % 8.59 18.549 0.00 86.82 
INSTITSH % 72.96 13.815 27.27 95.14 
AIFRS % 29.00 45.60 0.000 1.000 
DAs 0.076 0.413 0.84 1.38 
AUDITOR % 76.00 42.80 0.000 1.000 
Note: ROA is the return on assets. ROE is the return on 
equity. Q is the Tobin’s Q. DUALITY is when the CEO and the 
Chairman posts are occupied by the same person. BODSIZE is the 
number of board members. BODINDP is the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board. AUCOM is a dummy variable 
that has the value of 1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 if 
not. RECOM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm 
has a remuneration committee and 0 if not. GEAR is the ratio of 
total debt to capital employed. SIZE is the log of sales. MGROWN 
is the % shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the 
total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater 
than 3%. AIFRS is the adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards. DAs is the discretionary accruals. 
AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor. 
 
Table 4 compares the differences in board 
structure variables across Ghanaian listed firms 
during the pre-Code and the post-Code sub-periods 
to enable us to investigate the extent to which there 
have been significant changes in the keyboard 
structure monitoring mechanisms. As Table 4 
shows, CEO duality although experienced 2% 
decrease, the difference is not statistically 
significant. However, board size experienced 
significant decrease during the post-Code period 
from 9.03 to 8.17. This suggests that Ghanaian 
boards became smaller after the introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code. Although the non-executive director 
representation on the board increase by 1% in post-
Code period, the difference is not statistically 
significant. More importantly, Table 4 indicates a 
significant increase in audit committees during the 
post-Code period from 33.30% to 85%. Similarly, a 
remuneration committee experienced a significant 
increase in the post-Code period from 16.70% to 
32.50%. These suggest that two of the keyboard 
structure mechanisms experienced significant 
changes across Ghanaian listed firms after the 
introduction of the Ghanaian Code.   
 
Table 4. Differences in board structure variables 
across Ghanaian listed firms 
 
 Pre-2003 
(2000-2002) 
Mean 
Post-2003 
(2004-2009) 
Mean 
t-test 
DUALITY% 17 15 0.316 
BODSIZE 9.03 8.17 1.843** 
BODINDP% 75 76 -0.546 
AUCOM% 33.60 85 -7.582*** 
RECOM% 16.70 32.50 3.563*** 
Note: The t-test in column 4 is the independent-samples t-
test (mean) based on pre-2003 and post-2003 introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code. The variables include DUALITY, BODSIZE, 
BODINDP, AUCOM and RECOM. The mean differences test for 
equality of means between pre-2003 and post-2003 board 
structure changes. A mean difference with (***) and (**) indicate 
that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at 
1% and 5% significant level. 
 
4.2. Results 
 
Table 5 presents the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients for the firm performance, board 
structure and control variables to determine the 
level of collinearity between the variables included 
in the analysis. As Table 5 demonstrates, there is no 
evidence of multicollinearity; hence, all the variables 
were included in each of the relevant regression 
models. 
Table 6 reports the fixed effect regression 
results for the impact of board structure variables 
on firm performance during the whole period from 
2000 to 2009. A positive coefficient shows high firm 
performance and a negative coefficient low firm 
performance. As models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 6 show, 
duality is found to be statistically significant and 
negatively related to firm performance measured by 
return on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s Q, 
suggesting that hypothesis 1 is supported. This is 
also consistent with prior researchers (e.g. Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) who 
argue that firms with the leadership structure 
combined tend to performance poorly as a result of 
implementing decisions which are in favour of the 
CEO’s personal objectives relative to the shareholder 
value maximisation.  
However, there is a positive relationship 
between board size and all the three firm 
performance measures, indicating that hypothesis 2 
is supported. Although the Ghanaian Code 
recommends board size to be in the range of 8 and 
16, this evidence clearly demonstrates that smaller 
board size is optimal across Ghanaian listed firms. 
Contrary to hypothesis 3, non-executive director 
representation on the board has no impact on firm 
performance, evidence consistent with Daily and 
Dalton (1993) and Wintoki et al (2012) who reported 
similar findings. Consistent with hypothesis 4, there 
is a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between the establishment of board committees and 
all the firm performance measures.  
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Table 5. Correlation matrix of firm performance and all other variables 
 
 ROA ROE Q DUALITY BODSIZE BODINDP AUCOM RECOM GEAR GROWTH SIZE MGROWN INSTITSH AIFRS DAs AUDITOR 
ROA 1                
ROE .685 1               
Q .177 .184 1              
DUALITY -.003 -0.126 -0.040 1             
BODSIZE .107 .236 .114 -.297 1            
BODINDP -.194 -.185 -.182 .064 -.179 1           
AUCOM .025 .064 .034 -.035 .135 -.028 1          
RECOM .091 .035 .044 -.230 .331 .244 .254 1         
GEAR -.214 -.216 .031 -.104 .154 .142 .203 .212 1        
GROWTH .134 .161 .058 .037 .064 .035 .185 .017 -046 1       
SIZE -.066 .027 -.112 .075 .148 -.013 .015 .121 .230 .160 1      
MGROWN .230 .222 .198 .048 -.339 .031 -.018 -.167 .038 -.103 .127 1     
INSTITSH .139 .125 .277 .215 .247 -.168 -.078 -.097 -.011 .108 -.012 -.157 1    
AIFRS -.109 .083 .046 -.131 -.043 .028 .204 .045 .119 .039 -.123 .025 .039 1   
DAs .149 .126 .112 .075 -.083 .059 .063 .019 -.121 .064 -.167 -.045 -.028 .132 1  
AUDITOR .182 .092 .028 -.037 -.082 .189 .066 -.137 -.130 -.035 -.105 .435 .041 .056 -.078 1 
Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient during the whole period. ROA is the return on assets. ROE is the return on equity. Q is the Tobin’s Q. DUALITY is when the CEO and the Chairman posts are 
occupied by the same person. BODSIZE is the number of board members. BODINDP is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. AUCOM is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has 
an audit committee and 0 if not. RECOM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm has a remuneration committee and 0 if not. GEAR is the ratio of total debt to capital employed. SIZE is the log of 
sales. MGROWN is the % shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. AIFRS is the adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards. DAs is the discretionary accruals. AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor. 
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Table 6. Fixed effects regression results for the 
impact of board structure variables on firm 
performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ROA ROE Q 
DUALITY 
-0.174 
(1.80)* 
-0.250 
(2.23)** 
0.123 
(1.79)* 
BODSIZE 
0.341 
(2.28)** 
1.665 
(1.87)* 
0.178 
(2.05)** 
BODINDP 
-0.130 
(1.15) 
-0.383 
(1.05) 
-0.046 
(0.78) 
AUCOM 
0.140 
(2.73)*** 
0.231 
(2.04)** 
0.066 
(2.23)** 
RECOM 
0.132 
(1.93)* 
0.191 
(1.04) 
0.211 
(2.52)** 
GEAR 
-0.055 
(1.69)* 
-0.553 
(4.87)*** 
0.089 
(1.74)* 
GROWTH 
0.331 
(2.11)** 
0.426 
(2.39)** 
-0.076 
(0.43) 
SIZE 
-0.369 
(0.46) 
0.204 
(1.62) 
-0.017 
(1.14) 
MGROWN 
0.061 
(2.21)** 
0.124 
(3.13)*** 
0.158 
(2.38)** 
INSTITSH 
0.230 
(1.71)* 
1.421 
(2.87)*** 
0.062 
(2.78)*** 
AIFRS 
-0.349 
(2.26)** 
0.053 
(0.94) 
0.234 
(2.91)*** 
DAs 
0.368 
(2.47)** 
0.106 
(1.82)* 
0.205 
(3.23)*** 
AUDITOR 
0.051 
(1.52) 
0.158 
(1.97)* 
0.386 
(2.67)** 
_cons 
0.318 
(2.18)** 
-0.152 
(2.90)*** 
1.483 
(2.69)** 
R2 0.31 0.25 0.28 
N 283 283 283 
Note: In Models 1, 2 and 3, ROA represents return on 
assets; ROE represents return on equity and Q represents Tobin’s 
Q. DUALITY is when the CEO and the Chairman posts are 
occupied by the same person. BODSIZE is the number of board 
members. BODINDP is the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board. AUCOM is a dummy variable that has the value of 
1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 if not. RECOM is a 
dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm has a 
remuneration committee and 0 if not. GEAR is the ratio of total 
debt to capital employed. SIZE is the log of sales. MGROWN is the 
% shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total % 
shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. 
AIFRS is the adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards. DAs is the discretionary accruals. AUDITOR is the Big 
4 auditor. Year dummy and firm dummy variables are included 
in the regression models but their coefficients are not reported. 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
The analysis is developed to investigate 
whether the board structure changes influenced by 
the introduction of the Ghanaian Code can explain 
the whole period’s (2000-2009) results presented 
earlier. Consistent with the agency theory which 
posits that good corporate governance enhances 
firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we 
argue that the board structure recommendations 
introduced by the Ghanaian Code in 2003 represent 
good corporate governance and therefore expect the 
changes to lead to better firm performance relative 
to poor firm performance during the pre-Code 
period where board structures might have been 
ineffective monitoring mechanisms. To test this 
conjecture, we construct a variable ‘BODCHANGE’ 
which takes the value of 1 in each of the years 
following the introduction of the code and 0 for 
each of the years preceding it including 2003. 
BODCHANGE therefore measures the overall effect 
of the board structure recommendations on firm 
performance. 
First, we find that all the firm performance 
measures improved significantly after the 
introduction of the Ghanaian Code. In particular, the 
return on assets rose from 3.7046 pre-Code period 
to 8.1278 post-Code period, the return on equity 
rose from 13.0486 to 22.8554 and Tobin’s Q rose 
from 1.0333 to 2.8082, all differences being 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Models 1, 2 
and 3 of Table 7 present the results of the impact of 
board structure changes on firm performance. As 
Table 7 indicates, the BODCHANGE is statistically 
significant and positively related to all the firm 
performance measures, suggesting that the board 
structure changes influenced by the Ghanaian Code 
is associated with greater firm performance.  These 
results, therefore, suggest that the code 
recommendations have improved the key board 
structure monitoring mechanisms in Ghana.  
 
Table 7. Fixed effects regression results for the 
impact of board structure changes on firm 
performance 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ROA ROE Q 
BODCHANGE 
0.304 
(2.95)*** 
0.196 
(2.38)** 
0.267 
(3.13)*** 
GEAR 
-0.155 
(1.68)* 
-0.299 
(4.54)** 
0.105 
(1.73)* 
GROWTH 
0.134 
(2.11)** 
0.190 
(3.62)*** 
0.103 
(2.54)** 
SIZE 
-0.544 
(1.74)* 
0.182 
(1.63) 
-0.208 
(2.07)** 
MGROWN 
0.068 
(2.03)** 
0.161 
(3.18)*** 
0.032 
(2.75)*** 
INSTITSH 
0.222 
(3.54)*** 
0.137 
(3.88)*** 
0.247 
(2.06)** 
AIFRS 
-0.098 
(1.02) 
0.204 
(2.04)** 
0.178 
(2.43)*** 
DAs 
0.236 
(1.78)* 
0.196 
(1.68)* 
0.262 
(3.46)*** 
AUDITOR 
0.201 
(3.16)*** 
0.138 
(2.06)** 
0.125 
(3.24)*** 
_cons 
-0.158 
(3.02)*** 
-0.131 
(2.48)** 
-0.367 
(2.25)** 
R2 0.23 0.32 0.21 
N   283 283 283 
Note: In Models 1, 2 and 3, ROA represents return on 
assets, ROE represents return on equity and Q represents Tobin’s 
Q. BODCHANGE is a dummy variable which takes the value of 
1for years after the introduction of the Ghanaian Corporate 
Governance Code and 0 for years before. GEAR is the ratio of 
total debt to capital employed. SIZE is the log of sales. MGROWN 
is the % shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the 
total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater 
than 3%. AIFRS is the adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards. DAs is the discretionary accruals. 
AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor. Year dummy and firm dummy 
variables are included in the regression models but their 
coefficients are not reported. ***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 
10 percent, respectively. 
 
Given the significant impact of BODCHANGE on 
all the firm performance measures, we develop the 
analysis further to determine which of the individual 
board structure mechanisms is more effective in 
improving firm performance during pre-2003 (2000-
2002) and post-2003 (2004-2009) sub-periods. If 
each individual pre-2003 board structure 
mechanisms is ineffective because of the absence of 
code recommendations, then we would expect to 
find poor firm performance, whereas the agency 
theory would predict that the improved individual 
board structure mechanisms during post-2003 
should each lead to better firm performance. To test 
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this conjecture, we divide our sample into two sub-
groups and run regressions for each sub-group to 
determine the performance consequences of board 
structure changes prompted by the Ghanaian Code. 
 Table 8 reports the results for both sub-
periods where models 1, 2 and 3 represent the pre-
2003 sub-period and 4, 5 and 6 represent the post-
2003 sub-period. The results show that duality is 
negative and statistically significant during pre-2003 
but insignificant during post-2003, suggesting that 
firms that separate the posts do not perform better 
than those that combined the two after the 
introduction of the Ghanaian Code. As Table 8 
shows, board size has had a consistently positive 
and statistically significant impact on all the firm 
performance measures in both sub-periods showing 
that the board size of around 9 (pre-2003) or 8 
(post-2003) are all important in improving firm 
performance. Unlike Weir and Laing (2000) who find 
a negative and significant relationship between non-
executive director representation on the board and 
firm performance during both pre-Cadbury Report 
and post-Cadbury Report (1992 and 1995), we find a 
consistent insignificant relationship between them 
during both sub-periods. 
Of the board committee variables, there is 
insignificant relationship during pre-2003 sub-
period. However, there is evidence that both 
committees have had a significant and positive 
impact on all firm performance measures post-2003 
sub-period. These suggest that firms that complied 
with the board committee recommendations 
proposed by the Ghanaian Code perform better than 
those that did not post-2003 sub-period. Overall, the 
pre-2003 and post-2003 analysis clearly show that 
the initial results presented for the whole period 
(2000-2009) can be explained by the board structure 
changes prompted by the introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code. These results differ significantly 
from pre and post board structure-performance 
relationship studies conducted in developed 
countries such as UK and US (Weir and Laing, 2000; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2009), probably due to different 
institutional settings across these countries. 
 
Table 8.  Pre 2003 and Post 2003 Fixed effects regression results for the impact of board structure variables 
on firm performance 
 
 Pre 2003 (2000-2002) Post 2003 (2004-2009) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
ROA ROE Q ROA ROE Q 
DUALITY 
-0.123 
(1.68)* 
-0.172 
(2.12)** 
-0.296 
(1.85)* 
-0.195 
(1.65) 
-0.212 
(1.29) 
-0.059 
(1.11) 
BODSIZE 
0.223 
(1.88)* 
0.272 
(3.17)** 
0.196 
(2.55)** 
0.264 
(2.08)** 
0.167 
(1.79)* 
0.208 
(2.11)** 
BODINDP 
0.029 
(0.75) 
0.120 
(0.51) 
0.204 
(1.56) 
-0.022 
(1.18) 
-0.092 
(0.27) 
-0.018 
(1.43) 
AUCOM 
0.194 
(1.35) 
0.281 
(0.70) 
0.293 
(1.61) 
0.167 
(2.45)** 
0.096 
(2.30)** 
0.104 
(3.31)*** 
RECOM 
0.227 
(1.11) 
0.057 
(1.27) 
0.113 
(1.21) 
0.235 
(2.52)** 
0.161 
(3.38)** 
0.050 
(3.50)*** 
GEAR 
-0.024 
(1.18) 
-0.237 
(3.25)*** 
0.094 
(1.05) 
-0.033 
(1.70)* 
-0.222 
(2.19)** 
0.102 
(2.47)** 
GROWTH 
0.158 
(0.78) 
0.024 
(0.43) 
0.203 
(1.59) 
0.279 
(2.48)** 
0.284 
(2.97)*** 
0.097 
(1.78)* 
SIZE 
-0.071 
(0.81) 
0.093 
(0.93) 
-0.164 
(1.20) 
-0.063 
(2.08)** 
0.143 
(2.36)** 
-0.163 
(1.90)* 
MGROWN 
0.094 
(1.32) 
0.166 
(0.99) 
0.143 
(0.54) 
0.037 
(2.13)** 
0.073 
(3.09)*** 
0.089 
(2.31)** 
INSTITSH 
0.602 
(0.41) 
0.197 
(0.38) 
0.046 
(1.04) 
0.045 
(2.20)** 
-0.408 
(3.64)*** 
0.023 
(1.98)** 
AIFRS 
-0.125 
(1.06) 
-0.117 
(0.91) 
0.162 
(0.33) 
-0.285 
(2.55)** 
-0.217 
(1.81)* 
-0.232 
(3.03)*** 
DAs 
0.157 
(1.29) 
0.227 
(0.93) 
0.069 
(1.57) 
0.257 
(2.22)** 
0.260 
(3.45)*** 
0.056 
(3.47)*** 
AUDITOR 
0.218 
(1.24) 
0.197 
(1.46) 
0.073 
(0.63) 
0.368 
(2.05)** 
0.168 
(1.86)* 
0.376 
(2.51)** 
_cons 
1.823 
(1.75)* 
1.720 
(2.88)*** 
-0.085 
(1.78)* 
-1.830 
(2.34)** 
2.130 
(2.03)** 
2.029 
(2.99)*** 
R2 0.29 0.22 0.60 0.35 0.28 0.22 
N 65 65 65 193 193 193 
Note: In Models 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, ROA represents return on assets; ROE represents return on equity and Q represents Tobin’s Q. 
DUALITY is when the CEO and the Chairman posts are occupied by the same person. BODSIZE is the number of board members. 
BODINDP is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. AUCOM is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has 
an audit committee and 0 if not. RECOM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm has a remuneration committee and 0 if 
not. GEAR is the ratio of total debt to capital employed. SIZE is the log of sales. MGROWN is the % shares held by the executive 
directors. INSTITSH is the total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. AIFRS is the adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards. DAs is the discretionary accruals. AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor. Year dummy and firm 
dummy variables are included in the regression models but their coefficients are not reported. ***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 
percent, respectively. 
 
4.3. Robustness test 
 
We undertook additional analyses in an attempt to 
investigate how robust the results were to the 
problem of endogeneity and sectoral differences. 
First, board structure-governance performance 
relationship may suffer from endogeneity (Coles et 
al, 2008; Linck et al, 2008, McKnight and Weir 2009). 
In particular, the level of firm performance may 
determine board structure governance mechanisms 
rather than board structure governance mechanisms 
determining firm performance (Bozec et al, 2010). 
One way to address this problem is to use lagged 
values of the board structure variables as 
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instruments (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Himmelberg et al, 1999; Coles et al, 2008; Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2010). Following Larker and Rusticus 
(2010), we lagged all the board structure variables in 
Tables 6 and 8 to address the problem of 
endogeneity but the results were similar to those 
reported earlier. 
Second, the use of fixed effects regression 
model raises the concern of whether sectoral 
differences affect firm performance. Owusu and 
Weir (2016) report that there are seven industries 
across Ghanaian listed firms including finance, 
distribution, ICT, manufacturing, mining, 
agriculture, food, and beverage. To check the 
robustness of our results and following Gompers et 
al (2003), we exclude the dummy variables 
representing the 10 sample years (time effect) from 
equation 1 and use the industry dummies to control 
for sectoral effects. We, therefore, repeated the 
regression models in Tables 6, 7 and 8 and included 
6 dummy variables representing the 7 industries to 
control for sectoral effects. Overall, the results were 
qualitatively the same as those reported above.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper assesses the performance consequences 
of board structure changes across Ghanaian listed 
firms. We predict that the board structure changes 
prompted by the introduction of the Ghanaian Code 
in 2003 should lead to better firm performance. 
Using a sample of the Ghanaian listed firms from 
2000 to 2009 and a panel data analytical framework, 
our results over the whole period (2000-2009) show 
duality is negatively related to firm performance but 
there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between board size, the establishment 
of board committees and firm performance. 
We develop the analysis further to investigate 
how firm performance might have been impacted by 
board structure changes after the introduction of 
the Ghanaian Code. We find evidence to suggest that 
duality is statistically significant and negatively 
related to firm performance pre-2003, but those 
firms that separate the two posts did not perform 
better than those that combined the two post-2003. 
While we find no relationship between board 
committees and firm performance pre-2003, the 
relationship switched to statistically significant post-
2003. The most consistent result we find concerns 
board size. However, the non-executive director 
representation on the board appears to have no 
impact on firm performance. These results show 
that not all board structure recommendations 
introduced by the Ghanaian Code are effective in 
achieving superior firm performance in Ghana. 
Our results are important for Ghanaian listed 
firms and policymakers. For Ghanaian listed firms, 
the board size ranging from 8 to 9 and the 
establishment of board committees are value 
relevant. For policymakers, firms should be 
encouraged to implement board structure of 
between 8 and 9 if they are to achieve superior 
performance to the satisfaction of shareholders.  
There are some limitations to this study which 
require consideration when interpreting the results. 
First, we use a sample of Ghanaian listed firms and 
therefore generalisation of the results should be 
limited to this category. Second, the accounting-
based and the market-based performance measures 
used in this study are statistically significant and 
positively related to discretionary accruals showing 
that higher performance is influenced by earnings 
manipulation. Hence, a greater understanding of the 
board structure recommendations introduced by the 
Ghanaian Code in reducing earnings management 
may provide further insights into the effectiveness 
of board structure monitoring mechanisms. Also, 
future research could look into the board structure 
changes since 2009 and its impact on firm 
performance. This is of particular importance 
because a lot of changes might have occurred which 
could provide new insights on the board structure-
performance relationship nexus.  
 
REFERENCES  
 
1. Abor, J., & Biekpe, N. (2007). Corporate 
governance, ownership structure and performance 
of SMEs in Ghana: Implications for financing 
opportunities. Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society, 7(3), 
288-300. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700 
710756562 
2. Adams, R. B, & Mehran, H. (2012). Bank board 
structure and performance: Evidence for large 
bank holding companies. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 21(2), 243-267. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.002 
3. Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm 
performance and mechanisms to control agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
31(03), 377-397. https://doi.org/10.2307/2331397 
4. Baliga, B. R., Moyer, R. C., & Rao, R. S. (1996). CEO 
duality and firm performance: What's the fuss? 
Strategic Management Journal, 17(1), 41-53. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-
0266(199601)17:1<41::AID-SMJ784>3.0.CO;2-# 
5. Bennedsen, M., Kongsted, H. C., & Nielsen, K. M. 
(2008). The causal effect of board size in the 
performance of small and medium-sized firms. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(6), 1098-1109. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.09.016 
6. Bennett, R. J., & Robson, P. J. A. (2004). The role of 
boards of directors in small and medium-sized 
firms. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, 11(1), 95-113. https://doi.org/ 
10.1108/14626000410519137 
7. Berle, A. A., & Gardiner, C. (1968). Means. 1932. 
The modern corporation and private property 
(pp.204-5). USA/UK: Transaction Publisher. 
8. Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. J. (2009). Sarbanes-Oxley, 
governance and performance. Retrieved from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1361815 
9. Black, B. S., Love, I., & Rachinsky, A. (2006). 
Corporate governance indices and firms' market 
values: Time series evidence from Russia. 
Emerging Markets Review, 7(4), 361-379. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2006.09.004 
10. Black, B., & Kim, W. (2012). The effect of board 
structure on firm value: A multiple identification 
strategies approach using Korean data. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 104(1), 203-226. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.001 
11. Boyd, B. K., Howard, M., & Carroll, W.O. (1997). 
CEO duality and firm performance: an 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
432 
international comparison. Strategy, Structure and 
Style. (pp. 23–39). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.  
12. Bozec, R. (2005). Boards of directors, market 
discipline and firm performance. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9‐10), 1921-
1960. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0306-
686X.2005.00652.x 
13. Bozec, R., Dia, M., & Bozec, Y. (2010). Governance–
performance relationship: a re‐examination using 
technical efficiency measures. British Journal of 
Management, 21(3), 684-700. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1467-8551.2008.00624.x 
14. Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1980). The Lagrange 
multiplier test and its applications to model 
specification in econometrics. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 47(1), 239-253. https://doi.org/ 
10.2307/2297111 
15. Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997). 
Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and 
chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 3(3), 189-220. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2 
16. Buckland, R. (2001). UK IPO board structures and 
post-issue performance. (Accountancy, Finance & 
Mgmt. Working Paper, (01-5)). 
17. Cadbury Committee (1992). Report of the 
committee on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance. London: Gee Publishing.  
18. Chen, C. W., Lin, J. B., & Yi, B. (2008). CEO duality 
and firm performance: An endogenous issue. 
Corporate Ownership and Control, 6(1), 58-65. 
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i1p6 
19. Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of 
corporate performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 87(1), 157-176. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.006 
20. Cheng, S., Evans III, J. H., & Nagarajan, N. J. (2008). 
Board size and firm performance: the moderating 
effects of the market for corporate control. Review 
of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 31(2), 
121-145. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-007-
0074-3 
21. Cho, D. S., & Kim, J. (2007). Outside directors, 
ownership structure and firm profitability in 
Korea. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15(2), 239-250. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00557.x 
22. Coles, J. W., McWilliams, V. B., & Sen, N. (2001). An 
examination of the relationship of governance 
mechanisms to performance. Journal of 
management, 27(1), 23-50. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/014920630102700102 
23. Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). 
Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of financial 
economics, 87(2), 329-356. https://doi.org/1 
0.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 
24. Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board size and 
corporate performance: Evidence from European 
countries. The European Journal of Finance, 4(3), 
291-304. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847 
98337317 
25. Dahya, J., Lonie, A. A., & Power, D. M. (1996). The 
case for separating the roles of chairman and CEO: 
An analysis of stock market and accounting data. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
4(2), 71-77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.1996.tb00136.x 
26. Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J., & Travlos, N. G. (2002). 
The Cadbury committee, corporate performance, 
and top management turnover. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(1), 461-483. https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
1540-6261.00428 
27. Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1993). Board of 
directors leadership and structure: Control and 
performance implications. Entrepreneurship: 
Theory and Practice, 17(3), 65-82. 
28. Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & 
Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of 
board composition, leadership structure, and 
financial performance. Strategic management 
journal, 19(3), 269-290. https://doi.org/ 
10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::AID-
SMJ950>3.0.CO;2-K 
29. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). 
Detecting earnings management. Accounting 
review, 70(2), 193-225. 
30. Dey, A., Engel, E., & Liu, X. (2011). CEO and board 
chair roles: To split or not to split? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 17(5), 1595-1618. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.09.001 
31. Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship 
theory or agency theory: CEO governance and 
shareholder returns. Australian Journal of 
management, 16(1), 49-64. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/031289629101600103 
32. Dulewicz, V., & Herbert, P. (2004). Does the 
composition and practice of boards of directors 
bear any relationship to the performance of their 
companies? Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 12(3), 263-280. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00368.x 
33. Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). 
Larger board size and decreasing firm value in 
small firms. Journal of financial economics, 48(1), 
35-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-
405X(98)00003-8 
34. El Mehdi, K. (2007). Empirical evidence on 
corporate governance and corporate performance 
in Tunisia. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(6), 1429-1441. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00655.x 
35. Faccio, M., & Lasfer, M. (1999). Managerial 
ownership, board structure and firm value: The UK 
evidence. (Cass Business School Research Paper). 
36. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the 
theory of the firm. The journal of political 
economy, 288-307. https://doi.org/10.1086 
/260866 
37. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of 
ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics. 26(2), 301-325 https://doi.org/ 
10.1086/467037 
38. Garay, U., & González, M. (2008). Corporate 
governance and firm value: The case of Venezuela. 
Corporate Governance: An international review, 
16(3), 194-209. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2008.00680.x 
39. Ghosh, S. (2006). Do board characteristics affect 
corporate performance? Firm-level evidence for 
India. Applied Economics Letters, 13(7), 435-443. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504850500398617 
40. Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The 
effects of board size and diversity on strategic 
change. Strategic management journal, 15(3), 241-
250. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250150305 
41. Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). 
Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-155 https:// 
doi.org/10.1162/00335530360535162 
42. Guest, P. M. (2009). The impact of board size on 
firm performance: evidence from the UK. The 
European Journal of Finance, 15(4), 385-404. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13518470802466121 
43. Guo, Z., & Kga, U. K. (2012). Corporate governance 
and firm performance of listed firms in Sri Lanka. 
Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 40, 664-
667. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2012. 
03.246 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
433 
44. Guillet, B. D., Seo, K., Kucukusta, D., & Lee, S. 
(2013). CEO duality and firm performance in the 
US restaurant industry: Moderating role of 
restaurant type. International Journal of 
Hospitality Management, 33, 339-346. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.10.004 
45. Gupta, M., & Fields, L. P. (2009). Board 
independence and corporate governance: evidence 
from director resignations. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 36(1‐2), 161-184. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02113.x 
46. Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate 
governance structure and performance of 
Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 33(7‐8), 1034-1062. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.00594.x 
47. Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in 
econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 46(6), 1251-1271. https:// 
doi.org/10.2307/1913827 
48. Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The 
effects of board composition and direct incentives 
on firm performance. Financial management, 20(4) 
101-112.   
49. Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. 
(1999). Understanding the determinants of 
managerial ownership and the link between 
ownership and performance. Journal of financial 
economics, 53(3), 353-384. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00025-2 
50. Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009). Board structure and 
firm performance: Evidence from India's top 
companies. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 17(4), 492-509. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00760.x 
51. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of 
the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial 
economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
0304-405X(76)90026-X 
52. Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial 
revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1993.tb04022.x 
53. Kajola, S. O. (2008). Corporate governance and 
firm performance: The case of Nigerian listed 
firms. European journal of economics, finance and 
administrative sciences, 14(14), 16-28. 
54. Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board 
composition and corporate performance: How the 
Australian experience informs contrasting theories 
of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 11(3), 189-205. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00318 
55. Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate 
governance, investor protection, and performance 
in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 10(5), 703-728. https://doi.org/10.1016 
/S0929-1199(03)00046-4 
56. Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board 
committee structure. The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 41(1), 275-304. https://doi.org/ 
10.1086/467391 
57. Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Biekpe, N. (2006). The 
relationship between board size, board 
composition, CEO duality and firm performance: 
Experience from Ghana. Corporate Ownership and 
Control, 4(2), 114-122. 
58. Laing, D., & Weir, C. M. (1999). Governance 
structures, size and corporate performance in UK 
firms. Management Decision, 37(5), 457-464. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/00251749910274234 
59. Lam, T. Y., & Lee, S. K. (2012). Family ownership, 
board committees and firm performance: evidence 
from Hong Kong. Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society, 12(3), 
353-366. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211234609 
60. Larcker, D. F, &. Rusticus, T. O. (2010). On the use 
of instrumental variables in accounting research. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(3), 186-
205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009. 11.004 
61. Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2009). The 
effects and unintended consequences of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the supply and demand for 
directors. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3287-
3328. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn084 
62. Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest 
proposal for improved corporate governance. The 
business lawyer, 48, 59-77. 
63. Lasfer, M. A. (20040. On the monitoring role of the 
board of directors: The case of the adoption of 
Cadbury recommendations in the UK. Advances in 
Financial Economics, 9, 287-326. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09012-7 
64. Mak, Y. T., & Kusnadi, Y. (2005). Size really 
matters: Further evidence on the negative 
relationship between board size and firm value. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(3), 301-318. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2004.09.002 
65. Mangena, M., Tauringana, V., & Chamisa, E. (2012). 
Corporate boards, ownership structure and firm 
performance in an environment of severe political 
and economic crisis. British Journal of 
Management, 23(S1), S23-S41. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2011.00804.x 
66. Mashayekhi, B., & Bazaz, M. S. (2008). Corporate 
governance and firm performance in Iran. Journal 
of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 4(2), 
156-172. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1815-
5669(10)70033-3 
67. McKnight, P. J., & Weir, C. (2009). Agency costs, 
corporate governance mechanisms and ownership 
structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: 
A panel data analysis. The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, 49(2), 139-158. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2007.09.008 
68. Meyer, E., & de Wet, J. H. V. H. (2013). The impact 
of board structure on the financial performance of 
listed South African companies. Corporate Board: 
role, duties and composition, 9(3), 18-31. 
69. O’Connell, V., & Cramer, N. (2010). The 
relationship between firm performance and board 
characteristics in Ireland. European Management 
Journal, 28(5), 387-399. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.emj.2009.11.002  
70. Owusu, A., & Weir, C. (2016). The governance-
performance relationship: evidence from Ghana. 
Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 17(3), 
285-310. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAAR-06-2014-
0057 
71. O'Sullivan, N., & Wong, P. (1999). Board 
composition, ownership structure and hostile 
takeovers: Some UK evidence. Accounting and 
Business Research, 29(2), 139-155. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/00014788.1999.9729575 
72. Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board 
composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective. Journal of management studies, 29(4), 
411-438. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6486.1992.tb00672.x 
73. Peng, M. W., Zhang, S., & Li, X. (2007). CEO duality 
and firm performance during China's institutional 
transitions. Management and Organization 
Review, 3(2), 205-225. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007.00069.x 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
434 
74. Pi, L., & Timme, S. G. (1993). Corporate control and 
bank efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
17(2), 515-530. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-
4266(93)90050-N 
75. Rechner, P. L, & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO duality 
and organizational performance: A longitudinal 
analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 
155-160. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj. 4250120206 
76. Sami, H., Wang, J., & Zhou, H. (2011). Corporate 
governance and operating performance of Chinese 
listed firms. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 20(2), 106-114. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2011.06.005 
77. Sanda, A. U., Mikailu, A. S., & Garba, T. (2010). 
Corporate governance mechanisms and firms' 
financial performance in Nigeria. Afro-Asian 
Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2(1), 22-39. 
https://doi.org/10.1504/AAJFA.2010.035193 
78. Short, H., & Keasey, K. (1999). Managerial 
Ownership and the Performance of Firms: 
Evidence from the UK. Journal of corporate 
finance, 5(1), 79-101. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
S0929-1199(98)00016-9 
79. Soliman, M. M., Ragab, A. A., & Eldin, M. B. (2014). 
Corporate governance structure and firm’ financial 
performance: Evidences from Egypt. Corporate 
Board: role, duties and composition, 10(1), 49-59. 
80. Sonnenfeld, J. A. (2002). What makes great boards 
great? Harvard business review, 80(9), 106-113. 
81. Ujunwa, A. (2012). Board characteristics and the 
financial performance of Nigerian quoted firms. 
Corporate Governance: The international journal 
of business in society, 12(5), 656-674. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211275587 
82. Vafeas, N., & Theodorou, E. (1998). The 
relationship between board structure and firm 
performance in the UK. The British Accounting 
Review, 30(4), 383-407. https://doi.org/ 
10.1006/bare.1998.0075 
83. Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and 
firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 
53(1), 113-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-
405X(99)00018-5 
84. Weir, C., & Laing, D. (2000). The performance-
governance relationship: The effects of Cadbury 
compliance on UK quoted companies. Journal of 
Management and Governance, 4(4), 265-281. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009950903720 
85. Weir, C., Laing, D., & McKnight, P. J, (2002). 
Internal and external governance mechanisms: 
their impact on the performance of large UK 
public companies. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 29(5‐6), 579-611. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/1468-5957.00444 
86. Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1995). Who shall 
govern? CEO/board power, demographic 
similarity, and new director selection. 
Administrative science quarterly, 40, 60-83. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2393700 
87. Wild, J. J. (1994). Managerial accountability to 
shareholders: Audit committees and the 
explanatory power of earnings for returns. The 
British Accounting Review, 26(4), 353-374. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/bare.1994.1024 
88. Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). 
Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal 
corporate governance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 105(3), 581-606. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005 
89. Worrell, D. L., Nemec, C., & Davidson Iii, W. N. 
(1997). Research notes and communications - One 
hat too many: Key executive plurality and 
shareholder wealth. Strategic Management 
Journal, 18(6), 499-507. https://doi.org 
/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199706)18:6<499::AID-
SMJ898>3.0.CO;2-F 
90. Yang, T., & Zhao, S. (2014). CEO duality and firm 
performance: Evidence from an exogenous shock 
to the competitive environment. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 49, 534-552. https://doi.org 
/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.008 
91. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of 
companies with a small board of directors. Journal 
of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5 
92. Yu, F. F. (2008). Analyst coverage and earnings 
management. Journal of Financial Economics, 
88(2), 245-271. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jfineco.2007.05.008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
